The Text and Textualization of Codex BJ 168: Legal Culture in Transition at the High Court of Magdeburg Law at the Castle of Kraków by Munzinger, Mark R.
MARK R. MUNZINGER
(Radford University)
The Text and Textualization of Codex BJ 168:  
Legal Culture in Transition at the High Court  
of Magdeburg Law at the Castle of Kraków*
On 13 July 1398, Andrzej Czarnisza, the advocate of the High Court of Magdeburg 
Law at the Castle of Kraków from 1392 to 1416, turned to the ﬁ nal pages of a law book 
belonging to the court and began an inventory of relics that he possessed, but kept at the 
great church on Kraków’s main market square. Just a few lines below where the legal 
text of the codex in his hands ended, Czarnisza painstakingly began to write: Nota reli-
quias in cruce mea quam habeo in ecclesia sancte marie. Either because Czarnisza was 
a poor calligrapher or, as other sources suggest, very ill at the time, the lettering is a bit 
crude, but it is nevertheless quite clear that he was painstakingly attempting an approxi-
mation of a fancy book hand1. This effort would have been appropriate for an addition to 
the book before him, which was unlikely to have been chosen for Czarnisza’s notation at 
random. A study of this codex with a focus on the miscellaneous material included in its 
ﬁ nal folios – which include among other items the aforementioned inventory, excerpts 
from various laws, a scriptural text, and the formulae for several oaths – reveals that the 
law book in which the advocate of the High Court was writing was signiﬁ cant in its own 
right and lay at the very heart of the institution over which he presided. 
From 1356 to 1794 the High Court of Magdeburg Law at the Castle of Kraków met 
in the treasury of the palace on the Wawel hill to resolve disputes and handle a variety of 
non-contentious legal matters pertaining to the German law jurisdiction of the surround-
ing region, an endeavor that ultimately resulted in the institutional possession of dozens 
of books of various kinds. During the court’s medieval period of operation, when the ar-
chival collection amounted to a handful of registers, these were kept, along with several 
* The author wishes to thank Dr. Monika Jaglarz and the staff of the manuscript reading room at the 
library of the Jagiellonian University for their invaluable assistance.
1 BJ 168, 87v. The hand is a careful, but not well executed gothica textualis semi-quadrata. For Czarnisza’s 
possible illness, see Najstarsza księga sądu najwyższego prawa niemieckiego na zamku krakowskim, ed. 
A. Kłodziński [in:] Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej, t. 10, PAU, Kraków 1936, p. xxiii. 
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other books and ceremonial paraphernalia, at the home of the court’s current advocate2. 
Among the volumes in his possession were several law books, exemplars of the German 
law administered by the High Court at Kraków. Although it had originated in oral cus-
tom, this law had attained written form in the thirteenth century as the Sachsenspiegel 
and the Magdeburg Weichbildrecht, the combination of which was generally called in 
Latin the Ius Magdeburgense, or “Magdeburg law”3. Having been captured on parch-
ment, variants of this body of law spread broadly across east-central Europe during the 
later Middle Ages.
Although the High Court at Kraków ultimately possessed several exemplars of these 
texts in various forms by the end of its period of operation, the book chosen by Czarnisza 
for his notation, a codex containing the court’s original fourteenth-century exemplars 
that was donated by Kazimierz the Great (1333–1370) when he founded the court, con-
tinued to hold pride of place4 Indeed, on the occasion of Stanisław Augustus’ conﬁ rma-
tion of the court’s charter in 1765, this book was handsomely rebound and furnished 
with a newly printed title page that highlighted the initial foundation and successive 
royal conﬁ rmations down to that day5. As a result of this obvious care, the legal historian 
Antoni Helcel noted in 1856 that the court had preserved this book “as if it were a jewel” 
until the German law jurisdiction was ﬁ nally abolished in 17946. There can be no doubt 
that this book, which is preserved today at the library of the Jagiellonian University as 
manuscript BJ 168, had a special meaning for the High Court of Magdeburg Law at the 
Castle of Kraków from its earliest days7. Clearly, the royal origin of this codex and, later, 
its antiquity lent it a certain prestige, but its ultimate signiﬁ cance lay at a deeper level, 
in the vital symbolic and practical roles that the book played throughout the court’s 
medieval period of operation and beyond. This dual function, it will be argued below, 
represents a transformation in legal culture that was marked by the coexistence of rather 
different perspectives in legal consciousness as reﬂ ected in attitudes about law books and 
their contents. This duality points to the complexity of the social and cultural context in 
2 L. Łysiak, Ius supremum Maydeburgense castri Cracoviensis, 1356–1794: Organisation, Tätigkeit und 
Stellung des Krakauer Oberhofs in der Rechtsprechung Altpolens, Ius Commune Sonderhefte, Bd. 49, Vit-
torio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1990, p. 6, 36; Z. Wenzel-Homecka, Inwentarz Akt Sądów Wyższych 
Prawa Miejskiego w Krakowie, Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, Warszawa 1970, p. 17. 
3 The Sachsenspiegel was a collection of the customary territorial and feudal laws of Saxony compiled 
by Eike von Repgow around 1235. Generally, only the “Landrecht” was included in Polish collections; Polish 
nobles were under the jurisdiction of Polish customary law. The Magdeburg Weichbildrecht was essentially 
the town law of Magdeburg, the original dated to 1188. Although these texts formed the core of the Ius 
Magdeburgense as a written body of law, it ultimately appeared in a variety of versions that included the 
addition of material from later town charters, various collections of judicial decisions, and commentary.
4 For the donation of Kazimierz see Z. Wenzel-Homecka, Inwentarz…, p. 21 and F. Bischoff, Beiträge 
zur Geschichte des Magdeburgerrechtes, “Sitzungsberichte der phil.-hist. Classe der kaiserlichen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften in Wien” 1865, 50, p. 336. The identiﬁ cation of BJ 168 with Kazimierz’s donation, though 
not universally accepted, is crucial to the argument herein.
5 For the binding see Z. Włodek, et al., Catalogus Codicum Manuscriptorum Medii Aevi Latinorum qui in 
Bibliotheca Jagellonica Cracoviae Asservantur, vol. 1, Polska Akademia Nauk, Wrocław 1980, p. 154–155.
6 Starodawne prawa polskiego pomniki, ed. A.Z. Helcel, vol. 1, Nakładem Księgarni Gustawa Senne-
walda, Warszawa 1856, p. 207. “Kodex ten, aż do nowszych czasów przechowywany jak klejnot w Sądzie 
tymże, dziś jest w Bibliotece Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego”.
7 For a full description of codex BJ 168 see Z. Włodek et al., Catalogus…, p. 151–155 and F. Bischoff, 
Beiträge…, p. 335–339.
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which later medieval legal development occurred and reminds us that, ultimately, the 
subject of legal history is the human world. 
The early modern title page aside, the book’s ﬁ rst folio is a copy of the 1356 charter 
by which the High Court of Magdeburg Law at the Castle of Kraków was brought into 
existence by Kazimierz the Great in response to a challenge to royal authority that was 
inherent to the jurisdictional structure of the kingdom. As was typical of medieval Latin 
Christendom generally, the legal order of the Polish kingdom was composed of multiple 
jurisdictions and marked by the coexistence of different legal systems8. In particular, the 
legal structure of early fourteenth-century Poland had been profoundly inﬂ uenced by 
a great expansion and reorganization of rural and urban settlement that had been under-
way for some two centuries. In brief, during the period of territorial fragmentation that 
marked Poland during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, various provincial princes 
and ecclesiastical foundations sought to exploit their lands more effectively by adopting 
the process of systematic colonization that had been pioneered by German lords between 
the Elbe and Oder rivers. In Poland, this system of colonization was known as “settle-
ment under German law” from the normative customs that regulated the relationships of 
the lords, magistrates, and inhabitants of the new communities9. 
The resultant pattern of rural settlement under German law ultimately produced 
a legal order with its own jurisdiction that incorporated settlements of Poles as well 
as immigrants10. Beginning in the thirteenth century, Polish lords also granted German 
municipal law, principally that of Magdeburg or some variant thereof, to existing or 
newly developed Polish towns11. As a result, a sizeable municipal jurisdiction of German 
law developed in Poland alongside its rural counterpart. By the fourteenth century, 
German law had largely lost its ethnic connotations and was seen as another variant in 
the jurisdictional structure of rural and urban lordship in the Polish provinces of Silesia, 
Wielkopolska, and Małopolska12. By the beginning of Kazimierz’s reign, the German 
law jurisdiction of the reconsolidating Polish Kingdom had grown signiﬁ cantly, espe-
cially in Małopolska, where, towns aside, the so-called Magdeburg law ordered life on 
a signiﬁ cant number of noble, ecclesiastical, and royal estates13. 
Nevertheless, the village and town courts that composed the German law jurisdiction 
of Małopolska were not organized in any systematic way and there were no clear lines of 
judicial instance, a situation that was exacerbated by a limited knowledge of this pecu-
liar law among the many Poles who lived under it. As a result, when a point of law was 
8 The situation throughout much of medieval Latin Christendom is explained in some detail by Manlio 
Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe, 1000–1800, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 
DC 1995, p. 78–111.
9 J. Rogall, Land der großen Ströme: Von Polen nach Litauen, Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas, 
Siedler Verlag, Berlin 2002, p. 56–59.
10 P. Górecki, Economy, Society, and Lordship in Medieval Poland 1100–1250, Holmes & Meier, New 
York 1992, p. 275–281. 
11 S.C. Rowell, The Central European Kingdoms [in:] New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 5, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, p. 774; F. Dvornik, The Slavs in European History and 
Civilization, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ 1962, p. 128. 
12 Ibidem, p. 277–282.
13 Ibidem, p. 272, 284; L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 18, 77; J. Rogall, Land der großen Ströme…, p. 71, 
notes that settlement under German law entailed the application of municipal law to the rural jurisdiction.
24 Mark R. Munzinger
unclear to local judges, or when a litigant wanted to appeal a decision to a higher court, 
recourse was limited. A castle court at Kraków, which likely had a practical competence 
limited to the local voivodeship, heard appeals from the German law magistracies on 
the royal domain, but did not respond to requests for legal information14. Soon after his 
accession, Kazimierz attempted to ameliorate the situation with the foundation of a su-
perior court similar to the castle court at Kraków, and likewise limited, at Sandomierz 
in 133615. This no doubt improved the situation, but it did not ﬁ ll the effective vacuum 
of a higher instance in the German law jurisdiction of Małopolska, a bastion of royal 
authority, much less the remainder of the realm16.
 In these circumstances, a request for a ruling on appeal or in response to a question 
would have been made to a municipal court in one of the larger towns, which might 
respond on its own authority. Although these courts could be quite competent, there was 
no guarantee that any given bench was staffed by men fully knowledgeable of the law 
and the quality of these local rulings no doubt varied widely17. Better results might be 
obtained by referring to a court manned by jurists certain to be skilled in the application 
of the law, generally to the judicial benches of the towns from which the original law or 
a variant version had originated. For Małopolska this often meant recourse to the city 
bench of Magdeburg, which received petitions from throughout east-central Europe and 
was famed for its authoritative, though expensive, decisions. Likewise, recourse might 
be had to the courts at Wrocław or Środa in Silesia. Magdeburg, of course, lay outside of 
Polish borders in imperial territory, as did Silesia after 134818. 
The situation in general was summed up nicely in the charter that composes the ﬁ rst 
folio of the codex under examination: 
[B]ecause the [judges] of the banal courts of German law are handing down interlocutory decisions 
to the litigants who contend in [their] courts and are promulgating equivocal decisions in as many 
cases, the said contending parties are taking their pleas and appeals beyond the boundaries of our 
realm […] to the city of Magdeburg, […] and to the detriment of our realm and the loss and trouble 
of our subjects, the aforesaid [judges] of our realm also exact [twelve] Prague groschen from these 
same litigants for the emending of judgments by the magistrates in Magdeburg as well as a certain 
sum of money for expenses, […] and what is worse, the said [judges] of the German [law] jurisdic-
tion, although they ought to render a complement of justice among litigants, are themselves making 
things difﬁ cult by referring [matters] to the [councils and judges] of certain cities in our said realm, 
to whom we have granted no supreme judicial power, […] nevertheless, from a certain temerity, 
they compel those contending in their presence to lay out a large sum of money in cases both great 
and small19.
14 Z. Kaczmarczyk, Kazimierz Wielki, Wydawnictwo S. Arcta, Warszawa 1948, p. 184.
15 Ibidem. Similar courts were also founded at Nowy Sącz in 1356 and Biecz in 1363, by which time they 
composed, the author believes, part of a larger systematic attempt to rationalize the German law jurisdiction 
of Małopolska, cf. Z. Kaczmarczyk, Kazimierz Wielki..., p. 236.
16 C. Michaud, The Kingdoms of Central Europe in the Fourteenth Century [in:] New Cambridge 
Medieval History, vol. 6, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000, p. 745.
17 Z. Kaczmarczyk, Kazimierz Wielki..., p. 184.
18 By the provisions of the Treaty of Trenčin (1335), Kazimierz renounced suzerainty over Silesia in 
exchange for John of Luxemburg’s renunciation of claims to the Polish throne. The province was fully 
incorporated into the lands of the Bohemian crown in 1348. See inter alia C. Michaud, The Kingdoms…, p. 747.
19 BJ 168, 1r.: “[…] quod cum aduocati, scolteti, scabini, iurati iudiciorum bannitorum iuris Theutunici 
dant litigantibus, in iudiciis eorum bannitis contendentibus, sentencias interlocutorias et difﬁ nitiuas in causis 
quam pluribus promulgant, dicti contendentes ad partes remotas Rynenses in Maydeburg ciuitatem, cui 
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The quest for authoritative decisions at local venues not sanctioned by the king or be-
yond the kingdom’s borders challenged royal authority because it suggested that the king 
could not guarantee justice and that that the nascent monarchical state, the Corona Regni 
Poloniae, was not fully sovereign20. As such, the German law jurisdiction of Małopolska 
presented the king with a great challenge – as well as an opportunity for the extension 
of royal power if the lands of the church and nobility that were settled under German 
law could be brought into the ambit of royal legal administration. In short, the assertion 
of royal sovereignty, internal and external, called for the institutionalization of justice 
in the German law jurisdiction under the auspices of royal government. In this context, 
Kazimierz and his advisors planned and executed the establishment of a sort of supreme 
court of German law at the royal castle of Kraków. Thus, in the year 1356, the royal 
chancery of the Kingdom of Poland published an enactment of the king that began, at 
least, to establish the unique tribunal later known as the “High Court of Magdeburg Law 
at the Castle of Kraków”21. 
The new foundation went hand in hand with the creation and development of the 
Polish state and its monarchy in the fourteenth century – the High Court at Kraków was 
to be an instrument and symbol of the king’s justice, royal political power, and the king-
dom’s territorial integrity. As a manifestation of the legal reforms for which Kazimierz 
the Great is well known, the court’s foundation charter was a reﬂ ection of the king’s vi-
sion of the state, a vision ﬁ rmly grounded in a contemporary legal and political culture 
that mixed traditional notions with newer academic ideas and cultural developments22. 
The charter’s arenga, though formulaic, made a very pointed, and traditional, statement 
about the relationship between the king and the law:
Since the yoke of self-control is contrary to the human condition and because men are most unwil-
ling to renounce license, the Divine Mind bestowed kings upon the people and consigned subjects 
nullo iure subsunt, et ultra ﬁ nes regni nostri appellaciones et prouocaciones interponunt, nostre maiestatis 
proprio solio et tribunali necnon proprii principis et domini iure et iurisdiccione obmissis et contemptis, 
et in detrimentum regni nostri, dampnum et regnicolarum nostrorum grauamen, aduocati quoque, scolteti, 
scabini, iurati predicti nostri regni a contendentibus eisdem pro emendis sentenciis a scoltetis in Maydeburg 
per nouem fertones latorum grossorum Pragensium et nonnullas summas pecuniarum pro expensis exigant 
et extra regnum nostrum in Maydeburg pro predictis sentenciis emendis transmittunt, per que honori, decori, 
iurisdiccioni, solio, tribunali illibatis nostris predictis detrahatur et turpitudini reseruetur; et quod deterius 
est, dicti adoucati, scolteti, scabini, iurati iurisdiccionum Theutunicalium, cum inter litigantes iusticie 
reddere deberent complementum, difﬁ ciles se in hoc reddentes, ad ciuitatum nonnullarum dicti nostri regni 
consules, aduocatos, scabinos, iuratos, quibus nulla a nobis super iure supremo et dandis sentenciis iuris 
Maydeburgensis a nostra maiestate regali nulla prorsus fuit uel est eis specialis ad talia loca ipsorum, extra 
eorum loca constituta, ultra terminos iurisdiccionis eorum attributa potestas ad vendendum ius supremum, 
nostro solio et tribunali de iure dumtaxat annexum, et sentencias aliquas dandum extra ﬁ nes eorum 
iurisdiccionis ad alias ciuitates, villas et loca, nulla eis a nostra regia maiestate auctoritas est concessa, sed 
ex quadam temeritate contendentes coram eis in causis tam magnis quam paruis pecunias ponere conpulerunt 
non paucas […]” (The author has emended the translation with the material in square brackets for the sake 
of brevity and clarity.) 
20 For the development of the national monarchy in Poland under the later Piasts see P. Knoll, The Rise 
of the Polish Monarchy: Piast Poland in East Central Europe, 1320–1370, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1972, p. 40–41, 170.
21 The date of the foundation is disputed. See Z. Kaczmarczyk, Polska Czasów Kazimierz Wielkiego, 
Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Kraków 1964, p. 84–85 and L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 23–24.
22 For Kazimierz’s patronage of scholars and schools, see generally, P. Knoll, Learning in Late Piast 
Poland, “Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society” 120 (April 1976), p. 138–149. 
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to their lords in order that vices left unpunished would not result in a catastrophic deluge of wicked-
ness. Thus, communities were subjected to the judgment and dominion of kings by the necessity of 
justice, and these very kings supply justice and weigh all impartially with balance, beam and pan23.
The language of the charter made it very clear that the king was the source of stabil-
ity and order in the realm by divine provision and that he was indeed acting to fulﬁ ll his 
responsibility to provide justice24. 
After acknowledging the existing disorder of the kingdom’s German law jurisdiction 
and the abuses it occasioned, the king inaugurated the solution: 
Wishing to remove injuries, burdens, vexations, and costs from our aforesaid subjects, having set 
out both to increase advantage to them in our realm and also to increase the honor and distinction 
of the royal majesty, we have appointed books of Magdeburg law and deposited them in our tre-
asury at the castle of Kraków, and in our same Cracovian castle we have established the Supreme 
Provincial German Law, in place and position of the Magdeburg Law of these same books [that we 
have deposited] in order that judgments and rights might be pronounced by our advocate and seven 
town or village magistrates experienced in the said provincial law of the aforesaid law [who will 
serve as assessors]25. 
This, of course, is the passage that is generally pointed to as the foundation of the 
High Court at Kraków, and, with the addition of sections detailing the constitution and 
competence of the venue, as well as discussion of the duties, obligations, and beneﬁ ts 
of the court’s personnel, the foundation charter clearly established a concrete institu-
tion. The new court was an advocate-assessor type of bench that was typical of courts of 
German law throughout central Europe26. As chairman, the court’s advocate facilitated 
its business, ran its sessions, and formally pronounced the decisions that had been ar-
rived at by the deliberation of the court’s bench. In litigation, the seven assessors deter-
mined what judgment was appropriate in a given case by deciding, on the basis of the 
law, which party’s position should be proved by oath27. 
Yet, the court’s foundation charter never directly spoke of the “Provincial High Court 
of German Law” that it in fact established. Rather, the above passage announced the 
23 BJ 168, 1r.: “In nomine Domini amen. Quoniam humana condicio dominantis sibi iugo libenter caruisset 
et homines libertatum minime abdicassent, si non inpunita vicia gravi pernicie scelerum redundassent, ideo 
diuina sentencia dati sunt reges populo et domini subiectis, ut necessario iusticie et iudicio ac imperio regum 
subessent uniuersi, quilibet equo libramine statera lance appensa, ipsi reges iusticiam ministrarent”.
24 Though arengae are often taken as mere rhetorical ﬂ ourishes they often reﬂ ected the real concerns of 
the party that produced the document. See L.E. Boyle, Diplomatics [in:] Medieval Studies: An Introduction, 
2nd ed., ed. J.M. Powell, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY 1992, p. 90–91.
25 BJ 168, 1r.: “Volentesque predictis nostris regnicolis dampna, grauamina, fatigas et sumptus 
remouere, profectum quoque et utilitatem eis nostro quoque regno et regie maiestatis honorem et decorem 
ampliare, libros iuris Maydeburgensis ordinauimus et in thezauro nostro castri Cracouiensis deposuimus, in 
eodemque castro nostro Cracouiensi constituimus Ius supremum Theutunicale prouinciale, vice et loco Iuris 
Maydeburgensis de libris eisdem promulgari debere sentencias et iura per aduocatum nostrum et septem 
scoltetos seu aduocatos, dicti iuris prouincialis peritos iuris predicti” (The author has added the material in 
square brackets to the translation for the sake of clarity).
26 The term “assessor” is used for the German law scabinus (Schöffe [Ger.], ławnik [Pol.]) and should not 
be confused with the assessor who served as a functionary in church courts.
27 Cf. C. Schott, Der Sachsenspiegel als mittelalterliches Rechtsbuch [in:] R. Schmidt-Wiiegand Die 
Wolfenbütteler Bilderhandschrift des Sachsenspiegels: Aufsätze und Untersuchungen, Akademie Verlag, 
Berlin 1993, p. 41.
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establishment of a Ius supremum Theutunicale provinciale, not a Iudicium supremum 
Theutunicale provinciale. In literal terms, the foundation charter established a supreme 
body of law, not a supreme tribunal. Although the term ius, in the proper context, some-
times referred to a “court” in medieval Latin, this was always a transferred meaning, as 
the context of the above passage indicates. That ius was meant in the sense of “law” in 
the court’s foundation document is further indicated by a 1399 charter of Władysław 
Jagiełło which clearly distinguishes the possible meanings of the word by referring to 
the High Court at Kraków as the iudicium iuris theutonici castri Cracoviensis28. It seems 
likely enough, however, that the dual implication was not lost on the composer of the 
foundation charter since the existence of a court competent to handle litigation and hand 
down advisory statements as a consequence of the charter’s promulgation was taken for 
granted. In sum, the court as an institution was very closely identiﬁ ed with the body of 
law that it would administer29. 
In turn, that law was clearly closely associated with the very books the king originally 
deposited in the treasury of the Wawel castle. The court’s foundation charter, which high-
lighted the deposit of those books, amounted to a sweeping legislative act that brought 
a complete royal law into existence all at once. Kazimierz confected no new statutory 
statements beyond the foundation charter to create the new body of law that would sup-
plant the Ius Magdeburgense. Rather, the Ius supremum Theutunicale provinciale was 
basically composed of the same substance as “the Magdeburg Law of these same books”. 
With respect to its norms, what would be known as the Ius supremum Magdeburgense 
castri Cracoviensis by the end of the century, the “Supreme Magdeburg Law of the 
Castle of Kraków, was essentially, as the term provinciale in the original name perhaps 
indicates, identical to the customary German law already in use in Małopolska – or at 
least to the books that represented it30. 
Clearly, the foundation charter’s signiﬁ cance lay in the creation of an institution that 
was competent to act as the highest judicial instance of the German law jurisdiction of 
Małopolska and in the effective provision of justice under the auspices of the Polish 
crown without recourse to entities either not sanctioned by the crown or located outside 
of the kingdom31. In the developing legal and political culture of later medieval Poland, 
28 Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Miasta Krakowa, ed. F. Piekosiński, part 1 [in:] Monumenta Medii Aevi 
Historica, vol. 5, Nakładem Akademii Umiejętności Krakowskiej, Kraków 1879, p. 122–124, (no. 91): “[…] 
liceat eidem […] ad Advocatum et Scabinos supremi Iuris theotonici Maydebugensis, quod et Provinciale 
dicitur, Castri nostri Cracoviensis a predictos Advocato et Scabinis civitatis Cracoviensis et ab eorum 
sentencia libere appellare. Quod et si aliqua parcium earundem litigancium sive sit actor sive reus, ibidem 
in prefato Iudicio Iuris theotonici Castri Cracoviensis per ipsius Iudicii Advocatum et Scabinos se viderit 
aggravatum, extunc ad nostram regiam presenciam velud ad supremum iudicem […] appellandi […] plenam 
habeat facultatem”.
29 As is clear from later sources as well. See, for example, a letter of 1415 from the municipal court of 
Kraków to the High Court that addressed the judges des oebirstin deuschin rechtes czu Cracov off dem hausz 
[in:] Najstarsza księga…, p. 467 (no. 3769).
30 F. Bischoff, Beiträge…, p. 368, reaches a similar conclusion by noting that the exemplar of the 
Weichbildrecht from which the text of BJ 168 originated was already in use in Kraków. Terminology similar 
to Ius supremum Magdeburgense castri Cracoviensis was in use by at least 1399, see Władysław Jagiełło’s 
charter of that year, note 28 above. 
31 The foundation charter also provided for appeal from the decisions of the High Court to a Commissary 
Court of the Six Cities, so called because its members were called on an ad hoc basis from six of the major 
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however, this foundation seems necessarily to have presupposed a new body of law, 
a law unequivocally associated with the king and divorced by royal edict from any other 
jurisdictional authority. In this respect, the High Court’s foundation charter, a legisla-
tive act, was also a declaration of the sovereignty of the Polish crown. This sophisti-
cated reasoning was quite likely the product of the university-trained minds with which 
Kazimierz surrounded himself32. 
In any event, given the close association of this new law with the books mentioned 
in the charter, the existence of the High Court at Kraków as the highest instance of this 
jurisdiction was, in a legal consciousness formed within the framework of textualization 
(as will be explained below), bound closely to the exemplars of the Sachsenspiegel and 
Magdeburg Weichbildrecht, the “books of Magdeburg law” with which it was endowed 
at its foundation. Deﬁ ning, as they did, the court’s competence and jurisdiction, these 
legal texts lay at its heart as the substance of the law it would administer. Thus, codex 
BJ 168, the origin of which signiﬁ ed royal authority, and in which the German law texts 
were bound together, lay at the court’s core as a physical object that embodied an identi-
ﬁ cation of law and institution as the Ius supremum Magdeburgense castri Cracoviensis33. 
The symbolic signiﬁ cance of the codex to the court from its inception is inescapable. 
The physical location of the court and codex at the royal complex on the Wawel hill 
in Kraków was obviously signiﬁ cant as well. The Wawel was the preeminent symbol of 
kingdom and crown in late medieval Poland. Besides its place in royal mythology as the 
site where Krak, the legendary ﬁ rst king of Poland, slew a dragon, the Wawel was the 
location of the coronations of Władysław Łokietek and Kazimierz the Great in lieu of 
the previous coronation site at Gniezno. Father and son expressly selected the cathedral 
on the Wawel because Kraków had become the focus of the idea of Polish unity within 
a regnum34. As such, the location of the court left no doubt that its rulings were backed 
by royal authority. 
In intent, the establishment of what was later called the High Court of Magdeburg 
Law at the Castle of Kraków enhanced royal control over legal administration, remedied 
a default of royal justice by making it accessible, and eliminated the threat to territorial 
sovereignty posed by external lines of judicial recourse. With a competence that ex-
tended over Małopolska and sometimes beyond, the court ultimately made thousands of 
decisions that claimed a substantive basis in the body of law that was the Ius supremum 
Magdeburgense castri Cracoviensis. Kazimierz and his advisors may well have envis-
aged the High Court at the castle of Kraków as the linch-pin of a uniﬁ ed German law 
jurisdiction that would ultimately embrace the whole of the Kingdom of Poland, but this 
was not to be35. The court’s activities were largely limited to Małopolska, where, from 
its foundation until the early decades of the sixteenth century, it functioned in several 
towns of Małopolska. This venue was rarely used and its existence does not, in theory, detract from the 
supremacy of the High Court at Kraków in the German law jurisdiction since it was tantamount to an appeal 
to the king himself. This appeal “ad tribunal et solium nostre maiestatis” seems to have been conceived of as 
beyond the scope of ordinary jurisdiction. Decisions of the Court of Six Cities were absolutely ﬁ nal. See here 
L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 20. 
32 P. Knoll, Learning…, p. 138–140, 147–148.
33 BJ 168, 2r-87v.
34 P. Knoll, Rise of the Polish Monarchy..., p. 16, 39. 
35 Z. Kaczmarczyk, Kazimierz Wielki…, p. 184–185; cf. L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 75.
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capacities. In the ﬁ rst instance, the court heard cases that concerned the German law 
magistracies pertaining to royal estates, towns, several important monasteries, and pos-
sibly a few local noble estates36. On a broader basis, it also heard appeals and answered 
queries from a variety of rural and municipal courts of German law, sometimes from 
places as distant as Lwów37. 
The court’s jurisdiction was inexorably circumscribed from the sixteenth century on, 
and ultimately its activities were largely limited to the region in the immediate environs 
of Kraków38. Nevertheless, the High Court functioned without interruption until the year 
1791, when it was closed as the result of reforms occasioned by the Constitution of the 
Third of May. The court was reactivated in the period of reaction in 1792, but was ﬁ nally 
abolished in 1794 during the Kościuszko uprising39. Although the court may not have 
fulﬁ lled original royal expectations, it was arguably a successful and long-lived venue 
for dispute resolution. 
The core German law texts, the Sachsenspiegel and the Magdeburg Weichbildrecht, 
comprise eighty-ﬁ ve of BJ 168’s eighty-eight folios and are its primary raison d’etre, 
though, as was indicated above and will be further argued below, the book was much 
more than a reference work. To the extent that there was a normative written law, these 
legal texts were at the heart of the law practiced in the German law jurisdiction of 
Małopolska. Both the texts in BJ 168 were written in a medium quality Gothic book hand 
and provided with extensive rubrication40. Three historiated initials are displayed in the 
prefatory material and correspond with the Magdeburg Weltchronik (folio 9v), Eike von 
Repgow’s Rhymed Preface (15v), and his First Prologue (16r). So, although one might 
expect more from a royal donation, this was a manuscript of only better than middling 
quality, perhaps because it was intended for use. The two texts originated from the same 
hand and, from the construction of the codex, were clearly meant to be paired as the Ius 
Magdeburgense, as was typical in Poland41. The scribe may well have copied the text 
directly from a manuscript that belonged to the municipality of Kraków which in turn 
rested on a Silesian exemplar42. 
36 L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 81–82, 94–100. For the High Court’s records pertaining to this area of 
competence through the middle of the sixteenth century, see the Acta iudiciaria series of registers housed at 
the Archiwum Państwowe in Kraków (SWPM I-7-13, 16). Abdon Kłodziński published the ﬁ rst of these as 
Najstarsza księga… ut supra note 1.
37 L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 100–104. For the High Court’s records pertaining to this area of 
competence, see the Acta decretorum (SWPM I-20-24), two volumes of which have been published by 
Ludwik Łysiak and Karin Nehlsen-von Stryk as Decreta iuris supremi Magdeburgensis castri Cracoviensis: 
Die Rechtssprüche des Oberhofs des deutschen Rechts auf der Burg zu Krakau, 1456–1481, Ius Commune 
Sonderhefte, Bd. 68, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1995 and Decreta iuris supremi Magdeburgensis castri 
Cracoviensis: Die Rechtssprüche des Oberhofs des deutschen Rechts auf der Burg zu Krakau, 1481–1511, Ius 
Commune Sonderhefte, Bd. 104, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1997.
38 Ibidem, p. 76–77, 82, 88–89, 135–136.
39 Z. Wenzel-Homecka, Inwentarz…, p. 12.
40 The script might be more closely identiﬁ ed as a gothica textualis rotunda. The curving points of the 
upper quadrangles mark the regional style prevalent in Poland, Silesia, and Bohemia in the fourteenth and 
ﬁ fteenth centuries. See B. Bischoff, Latin Palaeography: Antiquity and the Middle Ages, trans. D.Ó Cróinín, 
D. Ganz, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990, p. 133–134.
41 J. Rogall, Land der großen Ströme…, p. 59, 61.
42 F. Bischoff, Beiträge…, p. 334, 341, 345, 357–359. The municipal exemplar is thought by Bischoff to 
be that found in manuscript BJ 169. In the manuscript tradition he employs, the version of the Weichbildrecht 
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While the book in this original form – a new law handed down by the king and identi-
ﬁ ed with the court as an institution – clearly had great symbolic signiﬁ cance, the codex 
would achieve a yet greater importance in the decades following Kazimierz’s donation 
with the addition of several brief, but unique, texts. Carefully appended to the front of 
the codex as its ﬁ rst folio is a copy of Kazimierz the Great’s charter of foundation dated 
to 5 October 1356, though it is certainly a later copy and likely dates to 136543. Clearly, 
then, the charter was not part of the original codex, but afﬁ xed sometime later. As the 
source of the High Court’s legitimacy and authority, as well as a schematization of the 
basic organization and operation of the court as well as the rights and responsibilities 
of its members, the charter was obviously a signiﬁ cant constitutional document that 
required protection. 
While the beginning of the codex was no doubt a convenient place to preserve a very 
important loose document, the attachment of this royal decree that explained and au-
thenticated the book’s importance was not accidental and ultimately composed an im-
portant constitutive element of the codex as a textualized artifact composed of several 
layers of meaning44. The charter could have been attached at any time after 1365, when 
the copy was produced, and before 1421, when Władysław Jagiełło renewed and con-
ﬁ rmed the High Court’s privileges on the basis of a copy derived from certis codicibus 
dictorum Judicum, by which he likely meant BJ 16845. It may well have been attached 
at the request of advocate Andrzej Czarnisza, whose abovementioned 1398 entry in the 
ﬁ nal pages of the codex combined with the fact that the court’s ﬁ rst extant record book 
(SWPM I-7) dates from the period of his tenure suggest that he took an interest in the 
various uses to which books might be put. 
Whoever arranged for the attachment, whether Czarnisza or another, would have un-
derstood that, with the appended charter, the book as codex (i.e. as a textualized object), 
was a powerful talisman that would represent to future generations a judicial legitimacy 
derived from royal and therefore, ultimately, divine authority – as the charter’s arenga 
suggested. Indeed, a few folios later, Eike von Repgow’s First and Second Prologues to 
the Sachsenspiegel (folio 16r–16v) similarly stressed the divine and royal origins of law. 
in BJ 169 is designated Cr, that in BJ 168 as C. On this stemma, Cr was derived, perhaps directly, from the 
version of Konrad of Opole, ca. 1306 (versio Vratislaviensis).
43 L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 171; U.-D. Oppitz, Deutsche Rechtsbücher des Mittelalters, vol. 2, 
Beschreibung der Handschriften, Böhlau, Cologne 1990, p. 612–613. Starodawne prawa polskiego pomniki, 
vol. I, p. 211–212, note 59, made the original argument for the date of the copy of the charter.
44 By “textualized artifact” or “textualized object,” the author means, simply, a man-made object that 
incorporates text into its design. A textualized artifact could be a wax seal with writing on it or an inscribed 
lintel. While it may seem quite obvious that a book is a textualized object of a different type since the object 
primarily serves the text, the point here is to distinguish between the linguistic meaning/intellectual content of 
the text and the material existence of the codex’s multiple texts as constitutive parts of the book. The physical 
relationship of book boards, parchment folios, and ink in the form of writing necessarily manufactured any 
symbolic signiﬁ cance that can be attributed to the codex. Further, one can conceive of each of the individual 
texts in codex BJ 168 (vide infra) as composing a physical (as well as linguistic) “semantic enclave.” As 
a textualized object, then, the codex communicates meaning in a way that is distinct from, though connected 
to, the linguistic content of its texts. Cf. R. Harris, The Semiology of Textualization, “Language Sciences” 
6 (October 1984), p. 278–279, 285. 
45 F. Bischoff, Beiträge…, p. 336; Starodawne prawa polskiego pomniki, vol. I, p. 207; Z. Wenzel-
-Homecka, Inwentarz…, p. 30, no. 2.
31
The prestige of the written word in a society yet mostly illiterate and the sacred, perhaps 
almost magical, quality of the codex-form produced a textualized item that was repre-
sentative of enduring authority in a very traditional way and was quite representative of 
an earlier medieval mentality that perceived books as items that served for the ediﬁ cation 
of posterity as symbolic objects46. 
If the book as a textualized object was a powerful representation of the mentali-
ty that underlay the court’s legal culture, so too was the book as linguistic text. The 
Sachsenspiegel and Magdeburg Weichbildrecht, bound together as “the Magdeburg 
Law” become the Ius supremum, was the nucleus of the normative substance employed 
by the High Court, an aspect that had both a symbolic and a practical function. To be-
gin with, the texts had a symbolic nature as ius scriptum, as written law, but this was 
a symbolism (and a form of textualization) qualitatively different than that of the codex 
as a textualized object that existed as an enduring representation of a judicial legitimacy 
and authority sanctioned by God and king47. By the fourteenth century, written law, per-
haps as a combination of the physical and ideational, promised contemporaries a new 
way to achieve justice, the notion of legality, the idea that disputes could be “prevented, 
avoided, or resolved and settled per legem”, by law, by the ruler’s law48. This notion, 
which was deeply impressed upon the general legal culture of the later Middle Ages, 
was expressed very clearly in the High Court’s Acta which noted, at the end of many of 
the decisions recorded, that such had been reached de forma iuris scripti, in accordance 
with the written law49. 
Symbolic importance aside, these formulaic notations in the court’s record books 
indicate the importance of the text of BJ 168 as linguistic meaning/intellectual content 
since the law book potentially served as a ready reference to the written form of the cus-
tomary law that the court applied in practice. Although it is unlikely, given the customary 
law context, that the advocate and assessors of the High Court found it either necessary 
or desirable to consult a law book before making each and every ruling, they no doubt 
had to do so sometimes. In this regard, one might note the glosses that were added to 
the margins of the book’s German law texts in at least one ﬁ fteenth-century hand. While 
these are few in number (only a couple dozen not counting mere nota bene notations and 
pointing hands) and brief (around ﬁ ve to ten words each) they do indicate that codex BJ 
168 was from time to time used as a reference in the court’s practice. 
The ﬁ nal folios of BJ 168, blank leaves in the codex as originally constructed, contain 
a mélange of various brief items in different, mostly ﬁ fteenth-century, hands. Brieﬂ y, 
folios 87v through 88v comprise an inventory of relics that pertained to the court, the 
translation of a couple of German law terms into Latin, a papal decretal, a fragment of 
German law, an excerpt from Roman law, a standard of land measurement, a scriptural 
46  Cf. M.T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066–1307, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA 1979, p. 116–122. Clanchy’s comments on Domesday Book (p. 121–122) are particularly 
revealing in this respect.
47 Textualization here simply refers to a qualitative distinction between the oral and the written, what 
Clausdieter Schott refers to as Verschriftlichung in his description of the trend towards the production 
of written collections of customary law in the thirteenth century, “Sachsenspiegel als mittelalterliches 
Rechtsbuch” (Der Sachsenspiegel, p. 27–28).
48 M. Bellomo, The Common Legal Past…, p. 156.
49 See, for example, virtually any judgment in L. Łysiak and K. Nehlsen-v. Stryk, Decreta iuris supremi..., 
1456–1481.
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passage, and the formulae for three oaths. Although the various items are generally un-
related to each other in terms of content, their inclusion at the end of this very important 
manuscript was neither haphazard nor accidental. These texts were important, in one 
way or another, to the operation of the court and align with both the practical and sym-
bolic purposes of the codex. 
The Magdeburg Weichbildrecht comes to an end just a few lines into the ﬁ rst column 
of folio 87v and is immediately followed by the abovementioned Nota reliquias of advo-
cate Andrzej Czarnisza, who was apparently the ﬁ rst to utilize the blank folios at the end 
of the codex for the entry of miscellaneous notes (See Figure 1)50. Czarnisza’s inventory 
is dated 13 July 1398, and one can presume that the material added afterward spatially 
was also added later chronologically, though the scriptural text on folio 88v may be an 
exception for reasons that will be noted below. Nevertheless, most of the appended mate-
rial was added in the ﬁ fteenth, and in one case the sixteenth, century. Regardless of their 
exact dates, the texts are indicative of developments in the culture of the court. 
Immediately following Czarnisza’s inventory of relics is a very brief and carefully 
executed cursive note that deﬁ nes a couple of German law terms, sune and orvede, in 
Latin as compositio and vindicte abrenunciacio or “oath of reconciliation” and “oath of 
truce”. The passage must refer to Sachsenspiegel xxiv in BJ 168, which states that, “An 
oath of reconciliation or oath of truce made before the court requires the witness of the 
judge and two other men. If it occurs outside of the court, then it requires the witness of 
six men present when the oath of reconciliation or truce was sworn”51. There is no further 
explanation and the reason for the Latin translation is unclear, unless there was some 
need or desire to equate the German law terminology with similar concepts in Roman 
law52. The procedural rule is clear enough, so perhaps members of the court needed to 
make sense of what was at stake in the context of the venue in which they operated: If the 
procedure pertained to preempting feud or personal vengeance in the original context, 
what did the rule refer to in the kinds of civil matters they adjudicated? The simple act 
of deﬁ ning the issues in Latin connected the court to the thought world of Roman law 
in which compositio had a connotation of reaching concord through compromise and 
vindicte abrenunciacio could be construed not so much as a renunciation of vengeance, 
but as an agreement to seek no further remedy through litigation. In short, the process of 
translation entailed a subtle shift of legal consciousness that pervaded the Ius supremum, 
about which more below. 
50 BJ 168, 87v.: “Nota reliquias in cruce mea quam habeo in ecclesia sancte marie. Primo lignum 
sancte crucis Bartolomey Nicolay Symonis et Jude Barbire Margarethe Katerine Procopi Leonardi Pancracy 
Ewstachy martyrum et confessorum xi milia martirum induliencie sunt in toto xxvii anni omnibus confessis et 
contritis. Scripta hec sunt per manus Andree Czarnisse advocati supremi juris theutunici Castri Cracoviensis 
in die sancte Margarete anno domini m0 ccc0 xcviii0”. Although it is possible that the relics were personal 
possessions, it seems more likely that Czarnisza possessed such an extensive collection ex ofﬁ cio, perhaps for 
use in the swearing of oaths by litigants.
51 BJ 168, 19r.: “Sune und orvede di der man vor gerichte tut, geczugit man mit deme richter und czuen 
mannen. Geschit is abir ane gerichte, her mus is geczugin salb sebinde der leute, di dem manne di sune odir 
di orvede tatin”.
52 See M. Bellomo, The Common Legal Past…, p. 152–153.
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At the bottom of folio 88 recto a short note in a careful cursive hand deﬁ ned the ex-
tent of a mansus franconicus in verse (See Figure 2)53. The Franconian manse (or laneus) 
was the standar d land measurement of the German law jurisdiction in southern Poland 
and its dimensions were often deﬁ ned by similar aide-mémoire in the empty spaces of 
Silesian exemplars of the Magdeburg law54. If, as one suspects, this measurement set the 
standard for the resolution of cases before the court, it is quasi-prescriptive in this text, 
and thus a part of the Ius supremum broadly deﬁ ned.
Three more substantial texts, excerpts from German, canon, and Roman law that ap-
parently handled issues not dealt with by the present German law texts or that needed 
clariﬁ cation, can be described as auxiliary law. The German law text of folio 87v, in-
scribed in a careful book hand, deals with the procedure for the denial or acknowl-
edgement of an obligation (See Figure 1)55. With its addition to codex BJ 168, the text, 
which probably originated from a collection of decisions from the assessors’ bench at 
Magdeburg, essentially became a part of the High Court’s Ius supremum56.
It is well known that the ius commune, as medieval jurists referred to the amalgam 
of canon and Roman civil law concepts and principles as they were interpreted and 
expounded on in the universities, greatly inﬂ uenced the development of secular law in 
Latin Christendom from the thirteenth century onward. Notably, the forms of romano-
canonical procedure developed in this context had a profound impact on the develop-
ment of secular procedure. It is also well established that the ius commune was employed 
as subsidiary or auxiliary law in situations where the established local law, what the 
scholars of the time called a ius proprium, had a gap or was not clear57. The ﬁ nal folios 
of BJ 168 provide a very concrete example of the use of the substantive elements of the 
ius commune in this very way. Indeed the codex provides here a textbook example of the 
reception of both canon and civil law prescriptions into a ius proprium, in this case the 
Ius supremum Magdeburgense castri Cracoviensis. 
The second column of folio 87v contains a cursive excerpt from an authoritative can-
on law decretal collection, the Liber Extra. Speciﬁ cally, the text (X 3.50.2) is a decretal 
of Pope Eugenius III that forbade priests and other clergy from appearing as proctors in 
the cases of laymen (See Figure 1). This issue, on which the German law available was 
presumably silent, must have pertained to the practice of the High Court in some way 
and the decretal consequently served as auxiliary law with respect to this matter. Indeed, 
53 BJ 168, 88r.: “Nota de latitudine ac longitudine mansi franconici per hos versus: Ulnis bisseptem 
fac virgam iungito pugnum, Bissenis latus ex hiis ﬁ et tibi mansus, Bis centum longus ac virgis septuaginta. 
Franconicus mansus perfectus sit tibi sensus et cetera”. This is an abbreviation of the full verse of ten 
hexameters.
54 F. Bischoff, Beiträge…, p. 339. Two examples appear in codex BJ 170b at 127v.
55 BJ 168, 87v.: “Eyn yczlicher mag yngesegil um yckliche zache dy vor gehegetem dinge nicht vorvestet 
ist czu ym czyn mit seynis eynes hant, unde der zache dy do undir beschrebin stet leuken adir bekennen. Ist 
is auch ab ymant briue hat von gerichtis halten umme schult und der beschuldygete sprichet her habe ym dy 
schult vorgulden her brichet den brif salb dritte. Is ensey denne dis dy zache alzo beschrebin zey das man 
dy schult andirzvo nicht gelden sulde wen vor gerichte”. The text is inscribed in gothica textualis rotunda. 
56 Sammlung deutscher Rechtsquellen, ed. H. Wasserschleben, vol. 1, Ernst Heineman, Giessen 1860, 
p. xiv–xv, 87.
57 Dictionary of the Middle Ages, ed. J.R. Strayer, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York 1986) s.v. “Law, 
Procedure” by Kenneth Pennington; M. Bellomo, The Common Legal Past…, p. 151.
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it was absorbed into the body of the Ius supremum in very literal way by being inscribed 
in the very book holding its substance. 
Folio 88r displays, in a Gothic hybrid script, an excerpt from the Roman law of the 
Corpus iuris civilis, the authoritative basis for the study of civil law at medieval uni-
versities (See Figure 2). Speciﬁ cally, the text is a part of Justinian’s Code that discusses 
the right of a widow to claim her dowry from her husband’s estate prior to the claims of 
all other creditors (Cod. 8.17.12). Again, this no doubt refers to an issue of concern on 
which the German law was either silent or unclear, at least in the context in which the 
High Court operated. Again, an element of the ius commune was literally received into 
the Ius supremum as auxiliary law. 
While the inclusion of these texts in a prominent spot in a book that represented 
a distinct body of law and the court as an institution indicates that they were in and of 
themselves signiﬁ cant, the adoption of these speciﬁ c prescriptions of Roman and canon 
law as auxiliary law is only the most obvious – and least inﬂ uential – manifestation of 
the reception of the ius commune in the jurisdiction of the High Court at Kraków. Far 
more profound was the clariﬁ cation or redeﬁ nition of issues pertinent to the court in 
terms of concepts linked to the ius commune that is implied by the inclusion of several 
of the texts at the end of codex BJ 168. In the broader scheme of legal development in 
medieval western Christendom, the use of the terminology of the ius commune by judges 
and notaries and the employment of its modes of argumentation in the litigation tactics 
of practitioners was a form of interaction between the ius commune and iura propria that 
resulted in a subtle, yet profound reconceptualization of law and its processes58. This, 
more than the adoption of a rule or two as auxiliary law, was the gradual process through 
which the variae causarum ﬁ gurae, the concepts and doctrines of the ius commune, were 
impressed upon the legal consciousness of at least some of the members and auxiliary 
personnel of the High Court at Kraków and thus came to play an important role in its 
culture. This transformation is well represented in the court’s Acta iudiciaria from the 
ﬁ fteenth century in which the substantive and procedural terminology of the ius com-
mune (e.g. vendicio, excepcio) provide the framework for describing the issues before, 
and actions of, the High Court. The progressive nature of this development is highlighted 
in the middle of the sixteenth century in a description of contemporary German law 
procedure by the High Court’s erstwhile notary Bartłomiej Groicki in terms that parallel 
romano-canonical procedure59.
The university training of the men who served as secular ofﬁ cials is generally indi-
cated as the conduit through which the habits of mind associated with the ius commune 
came to inﬂ uence local laws60. However, the majority of those who occupied the as-
sessors’ bench of the High Court at Kraków were citizens of that city and its suburbs, 
business men who were unlikely to have had university training in law61. The advocates, 
men of affairs who largely originated from Kraków’s urban patriciate, were expected 
to be thoroughly knowledgeable of the German law through prior experience, but were 
58 M. Bellomo, The Common Legal Past…, p. 153–154.
59 B. Groicki, Porządek sądów i spraw miejskich prawa majdeburskiego w Koronie Polskiej (1559), 
Part 3, ed. Karol Koranyi, Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, Warszawa 1953, p. 96–190.
60 M. Bellomo, The Common Legal Past…, p. 155.
61 M. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 45–47.
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equally unlikely to have had a formal legal education, though there were a couple of 
exceptions to this in the sixteenth century62 On the other hand, several sources indicate 
that at least a couple of the court’s ﬁ fteenth-century notaries had attended university. 
Thus, the ius commune is more likely to have made its initial entry into the Ius supremum 
through the court’s auxiliary personnel rather than its judges. 
The ﬁ rst page of a book containing the court’s Acta iudiciaria records for the years 
1451 to 1471 noted the following: “The present register has been provided by [the court’s 
advocate and assessors] and written by Jan Spiczmer, Master of Arts, at this time notary 
of the aforesaid court”63. Given his position at a prestigious institution, it seems quite 
probable that Spiczmer had studied the ars notaria, which had been stressed as part 
of the trivium syllabus of the University of Kraków from the time of the rectorate of 
Stanisław of Skarbimierz (1400–1431). This training may well have exposed Spiczmer 
to at least a few ius commune concepts64. Further, a record of 27 January 1457 noted 
that one Piotr Glowa was court notary at that time. Although it is not mentioned here, 
Glowa had at least some university education, if not legal training, as he appeared in the 
matriculation records of the University of Kraków for the year 142665. 
Glowa also appeared in the court’s records as one of the several proctors who regu-
larly represented litigants in their cases there. These men were not occasional proctors, 
but formed a nascent bar at the High Court at Kraków66. While they no doubt learned the 
substance and procedure of German law through experience and observation, sometimes 
as clerks and notaries, these proctors may have had some formal legal training as well. 
In western Christendom of the ﬁ fteenth century generally, it would have been relatively 
common for a proctor who practiced before an important secular court or a notary in 
an important public position to have studied in a law faculty for a year or two or more 
without taking a degree67. Though men like Jan Spiczmer and Piotr Glowa may have 
lacked a degree in law, this by no means indicates that they had not studied some law at 
university. Such men at least composed a potential conduit for ius commune inﬂ uence. 
Scripture, which like the romano-canonical sources mentioned above, was consid-
ered authoritative by medieval academia, brings one to the end of codex BJ 168. The 
upper portion of folio 88 verso is ﬁ lled with the ﬁ rst fourteen verses of the ﬁ rst chapter 
of the Gospel of John inscribed in a high-quality Gothic book hand, but worn in vari-
ous parts (See Figure 3). Below the biblical text, are the formulae for three oaths. The 
ﬁ rst two, inscribed in ﬁ fteenth-century hands, are oaths that were sworn by assessors 
when they were installed on the High Court’s bench. The ﬁ rst is in Polish, the second 
62 Ibidem, p. 30–33, 184.
63 SWPM I-9, 1r.: “Comparatum est presens hoc registrum per eosdem et scriptum per Johannem 
Spiczmir magistrum artis protunc predicti iuris notarium”.
64 N. Horn, Die juristischen Literatur der Kommentatorenzeit [in:] Ius Commune, vol. 2, ed. H. Coing, 
Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1969, p. 120.
65 Album Studiosorum Universitatis Cracoviensis, ed. B. Ulanowski, et al., vol. 1, Jagiellonian University, 
Kraków 1887, p. 62.
66 M.R. Munzinger, The High Court of Magdeburg Law at the Castle of Cracow: Legal Actors and 
Action in the German Law Jurisdiction of Little Poland, 1456–1465 (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 
2004), p. 139–142.
67 J.A. Brundage, Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession: Canonists, Civilians, and Courts, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago 2008, p. 169, 290–291, 395.
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in German, the differences in content are minimal. The ﬁ nal oath, sworn when a new 
notary assumed ofﬁ ce, is rendered in Polish only and was entered somewhat later, in the 
sixteenth century68. 
The pairing of this portion of this Gospel with the oaths was no coincidence. It was, 
in fact, common for this portion of the book of John, with its emphasis on the Word, to be 
present at the swearing of oaths during the Middle Ages – the symbolism is clear enough. 
Although clergymen commonly swore in the immediate presence of the Holy Writ, lay-
men usually swore their oaths while physically touching the Gospel69. This would ex-
plain the wear on the present text, which admits the possibility of a hand resting on it, 
and it seems quite probable that codex BJ 168 was an integral component of the cer-
emony in which a new assessor was installed on the high court’s bench. Unfortunately, 
to the author’s knowledge, no full order for, or description of the ceremony in which new 
assessors assumed their positions exists for the medieval period. Nevertheless, a tenta-
tive reconstruction of this event can be pieced together by analogy with later practice and 
evidence provided by codex BJ 168 itself70. 
 Following a vacancy on the bench, a new assessor was chosen by the mutual agree-
ment of the High Court’s advocate and the procurator general of Kraków (magnus 
or generalis procurator), the royal ofﬁ cial was charged with general oversight of the 
court71. Following the publication of their choice, the formal process of installation took 
place at a celebratory session of the court at its usual meeting place, the treasury of the 
castle on the Wawel hill72. Aside from the advocate and the current assessors of the court, 
the royal procurator or his representative and numerous other guests were present. The 
guests likely included some combination of the friends and relatives of the candidate, 
members of the local clergy, faculty from the University of Kraków, ofﬁ cers of local 
municipal institutions like the town council and municipal court, and various royal of-
ﬁ cials73. The court having been ofﬁ cially opened, the procurator general formally pre-
sented the candidate to the court’s assessors and had an ofﬁ cial document conﬁ rming the 
appointment read to the assembled group74. Later evidence suggests that at this point the 
prospective assessor may have promised that he would not engage in commerce or craft 
during periods in which the court sat75.
68 For the dating of the notary’s oath, see Z. Włodek, Catalogus…, p. 153–154, where it is mistakenly 
described as the oath of an assessor.
69 D.X. Junkin, The Oath: A Divine Ordinance and an Element of the Social Constitution, Wiley and Putnam, 
New York 1845, p. 175–176; H.G. von Thülemeyer, Octoviratus; seu, De S.rom. germ. imperii electoribus…: 
tractatio juris publici … Editio novissima, XXIV, 72–73, J.M. Rudigerum, Frankfurt 1688, p. 462.
70 The present reconstruction relies on the details of the installation ceremony for both advocates and 
assessors presented in Łysiak’s Ius supremum…, p. 36–37, 45–46 and on the descriptions of judicial oath 
in general rendered by Groicki in his procedural manual for municipal courts of Magdeburg law in Poland, 
Porządek…, p. 32, 37, 146–148. The remainder of this admittedly hypothetical scenario, particularly the 
procedure for swearing the oath, has been reconstructed here on the basis of evidence provided by codex BJ 168. 
71 L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 18; cf. BJ 168 1r.
72 Ibidem, p. 45.
73 Ibidem, p. 45–46; cf. the advocate’s installation ceremony, p. 36–37.
74 Ibidem, p. 46; likewise cf. the advocate’s installation ceremony, p. 36.
75 Ibidem, p. 45.
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Following this, the candidate asked the court for permission to kneel76. When grant-
ed, he knelt before the codex, which was held open to folio 88v by the court’s notary, 
and, after asking permission, he touched the text of the Gospel with two ﬁ ngers of his 
right hand77. The notary then read the oath, perhaps pausing at the punctuation marks in 
the text, with the assessor-to-be repeating the words verbatim78. The oath was likely read 
in either Polish or German, as appropriate to the candidate79. The Polish oath, to which 
the German oath is essentially identical, read so: 
I swear to God and our benevolent King and to this court of law to which I have been appointed, 
that I will be obedient to [the advocate] in accordance with the law, and also that I will ﬁ nd just 
judgments for people both poor and rich, and that I will defend the assessors’ bench in accordance 
with the German law as justly as I know how or am able, so that [its judgments] have validity. I will 
not forsake this for any cause, so help me the Lord God in Trinity80.
After the oath had been sworn, the juror asked, after seeking permission to rise, if he 
had sworn it correctly81. If he had, this was conﬁ rmed by the bench in what amounted 
to a formal decision of the court, an act which constituted the assessor’s formal assump-
tion of ofﬁ ce82. The new assessor was now formally set in his place on the bench and 
congratulated with “joyous applause”83. The guests departed and the court likely opened 
a regular session84. By that time, surely, the new assessor was keenly aware of the gravity 
of his new responsibilities. The symbolic essence of the codex, which obviously played 
a crucial role in the ceremony, and the language of the oath, which addressed God, king, 
and court and promised justice and, indeed, legality must have made a deep impression 
on juror and observer alike. It is worth noting in this regard, that in the advocate’s instal-
lation ceremony, which seems to have involved touching a cruciﬁ x rather than a book, 
the codex BJ 168 may have been among the insignia that were handed the new chairman 
76 By analogy with the general procedure of judicial oath, cf. Groicki, Porządek…, p. 148.
77 Alternatively, the codex may have rested on a lectern. For the position of the juror, cf. L. Łysiak, Ius 
supremum…, p. 45: “[…] ﬂ exis genibus positisque duobus manus dextrae ad imaginem Cruciﬁ xi digitis. The 
advocate’s presentation of his oath differed with respect to the sacred object involved and his formula did not 
appear in BJ 168. This may be because his oath was taken under the auspices of another ofﬁ ce, that of the 
royal procurator general of Kraków. One might emphasize in this regard that the ofﬁ ce of the advocate, as 
representative of the authority of the state, was quite distinct from that of an assessor”.
78 By analogy with advocate’s ceremony, cf. L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 36: “praelegente sibi rotham 
judicii eiusdem notario […]”. Alternatively, the juror may have read the oath himself. 
79 It may be that the oath was made in both languages, though this seems unlikely.
80 BJ 180, 88 v.: “Ja przysengam bogu y Nasschemu Mylosczymemu krolowy y themu prawu kw kthore-
mum weszwan yest, ysz ja themu sendzemu podlug prawa poslussen chcze bicz, y thesz Ludzom ubogum 
y bogathym sprawyedlywy ortel znacz chcze, y then przyschensnyczy stolecz podlug Nyemyeczkego prawa 
bronycz yako nasprawyedlywye wyem albo moga, y folgą myecz mogą a thego dla zadney rzeczy opusczycz 
nye chcza tako my pan bog pomosz w troiczy yedliny”, and “Ich swere gote und meynem herre dem konige, 
und dem gerichte do ich czu gekorn bin, das ich dem Richter: noch dem rechte gehorsam wil seyn und den 
leuten arm und reych, in dem lande recht orteil funden wil, und den scheppin stuel noch dem deutcze rechte 
vorsten wil so ich rechte konne und wisse und des folge habin wurde und den durch keyne sache noch durch 
liebe adir gobe lossen wil als mir got helfe und dy heyligen”.
81 By analogy with the general procedure of judicial oath, cf. B. Groicki, Porządek…, p. 148.
82 L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 46.
83 By analogy with advocate’s ceremony, cf. L. Łysiak, Ius supremum…, p. 36.
84 Likewise by analogy with advocate’s ceremony, cf. Ibidem, p. 36–37.
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as symbols of ofﬁ ce after he swore his oath85. Here, the court and the Ius supremum itself 
were symbolically put under the protection of the new advocate. One might also note 
in this regard that the oaths of the assessors were in part oaths of obedience to the High 
Court’s advocate. 
Arguably, the order of oath-taking described was derived from Roman law, though 
more likely from long standing custom than from the civil law revival of the twelfth cen-
tury86. Nevertheless, given the ius commune context mentioned above, it is worth noting 
that Justinian’s Novel 8 called for those undertaking to serve as public ofﬁ cials to take 
an oath in a ceremony that included physical contact with the Gospels: 
I swear by God Almighty and his only begotten Son our Lord Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit and 
the glorious Mother of God, ever virgin, Mary and the four Gospels, which I am holding in my 
hands, and the holy archangels Michael and Gabriel [etc.]”87. 
The status of the Gospels as a physical ceremonial object that stands with the intangi-
ble Trinity, the Holy Virgin, and the archangels in this formula is striking.
The need for the oaths page to be easily accessible for ceremonial purposes, and so 
on the ﬁ nal page of the book, raises the question of when it was created. The assessor’s 
oaths were written in a cursive ﬁ fteenth-century hand and the notary’s oath is of later, 
sixteenth-century, provenance, but the book hand of the Gospel text is more difﬁ cult to 
place and might range from the fourteenth to the ﬁ fteenth century88. Indeed, it is quite 
possible that the codex was used in the oath-swearing ceremony before the words of 
the oaths were added; they need not have been there for oaths to have been sworn on 
the book. Thus, the Gospel text could have been added soon after Kazimierz’s donation 
in 1356 or at any point thereafter prior to the end of the ﬁ fteenth century. One thing is 
certain; the text upon which future members of the court would swear to conscientiously 
carry out their duties would have been placed in a location that reﬂ ected the gravity of 
that oath, a circumstance that points to a contemporary perception of the book’s signiﬁ -
cance at the time the oaths page was created. If this occurred early in the court’s history, 
the original importance of the codex is indicated. If relatively late, the addition highlights 
the increasing consciousness of its symbolic importance, as discussed above. The pos-
sibility that it was added at the same time the foundation charter was appended to the 
beginning of the codex, perhaps around the time Czarnisza added his Nota reliquias in 
1398, is the most intriguing possibility since it indicates a conscious effort to take advan-
tage of, and enhance, the book’s symbolic value.
The present study has suggested that codex BJ 168 served multiple purposes for the 
High Court at Kraków and is, therefore, illustrative of several aspects of the court’s cul-
ture during the Middle Ages and, more generally, of the medieval mentality with respect 
to the uses of books within the legal culture. Admittedly, the foregoing study perhaps 
85 Ibidem, p. 36.
86 Cod. 2.58. 1–2; Nov. 8; 124.1.
87 Nov. 8: “Iuro ego per deum omnipotentem et ﬁ lium eius unigenitum dominum nostrum Iesum Christum 
et spiritum sanctum et sanctam gloriosam dei genitricem et semper virginem Mariam et quattuor evangelia, 
quae in manibus meis teneo, et sanctos archangelos Michael et Gabriel […]”.
88 The oaths are inscribed in gothica cursiva and the biblical text in gothica textualis semi-quadrata. For 
the dating, cf. Z. Włodek, Catalogus…, p. 153–155.
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raises more questions than it answers and therefore makes no claim to being the last 
word on the issues addressed; it is exploratory and suggests lines for further inquiry. In 
this light, a few tentative conclusions will be drawn.
First, the codex served an important purpose qua textualized object, as the symbolic 
representation of the Ius supremum Magdeburgense castri Cracoviensis and all that this 
body of law signiﬁ ed, including the institution that administered it. Each of the codex’s 
individual texts composed a semantic enclave; pockets of meaning that gave the book 
as artifact a powerful symbolic signiﬁ cance. Secondly, the codex served as an exemplar 
of ius scriptum (or textualized law) that composed a repository of, and reference to, 
the Ius supremum. On the one hand, the “textualization” of law in the Middle Ages is 
the creation of historians who discern a new trend in the composition of written collec-
tions of customary laws in the thirteenth century. On the other hand, one must certainly 
acknowledge that an increasing prevalence of ius scriptum created new expectations 
among contemporaries and occasioned a shift in legal consciousness. Although it was 
not compiled all at once, codex BJ 168, as both artifact and ius scriptum, was ultimately 
a very consciously designed item. Its practical purpose dovetailed neatly with its sym-
bolic and ceremonial purposes. It may go without saying that, when the textualized ob-
ject is a book, its function as a textualized object cannot be divorced from the linguistic 
meaning/intellectual content of the text, but does it go too far to suggest that in the 
culture of the High Court, if not the general legal culture of the later Middle Ages, the 
authority of the linguistic meaning/intellectual content of the legal text owed a good deal 
to its existence as physical artifact? 
In its completed medieval form, the codex began with the charter that brought the 
court into existence and established its basic constitution and mode of operation while 
simultaneously pointing to the identiﬁ cation of the German law texts that composed the 
bulk of the book with a new law and, thereby, a new jurisdiction under the sovereign 
authority of the king of Poland, the divinely ordained guarantor of justice for that land. 
The notion that the law was associated with the divine and that royal law was authorita-
tive is corroborated near the beginning of the next component of the codex. Here, the 
ﬁ rst prologue of the Sachsenspiegel proclaims that, “God is law itself so justice is dear 
to Him. Therefore, all those entrusted by God to judge shall strive to reach judgments in 
such a way that God in His wrath and judgment may treat them mercifully”89. The second 
prologue then equates God’s commandments with the laws of the model Christian rulers 
Constantine and Charlemagne90. As such, the codex was a concrete symbol of divine jus-
tice and the legitimacy of the royal legal and political authority that insured it, a textual 
monument for the perpetual use of posterity. In this respect, BJ 168 was possessed of 
a very traditional instrumentality that reached back into the earlier Middle Ages91. 
89 BJ 168, 16r.: “Got ist selbe recht darumme ist im recht lip, um das sen si sich alle vor den gerichte 
von gotishalden beuolin ist, das si also richtin, das gotis czorn und sein gerichte genediclichin ober si ergen 
muse”.
90 BJ 168, 16v.: “Nu wir abir irlosit sein mit sinim turmblute, nu sulle wir ouch haldin seine e und sein 
gebot, das uns seine wissagin und gute geistliche leute und ouch cristene kunge gesaithan, Constantinus und 
Karl an den das sachsin lant noch rechte tut”. [But now that we are redeemed by his blood, we keep His laws 
and His commandments, both those provided by the prophets and the clergy and those provided as law for 
Saxony by the Christian kings Constantine and Charlemagne.]
91 M.T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record…, p. 117–118, 121–122.
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At the same time, and in the context of the existence of the High Court, the combination 
of this royal guarantee of justice with exemplars of the written law, the Sachsenspiegel 
and Weichbildrecht, symbolically conveyed something newer, abstract, and perhaps less 
consciously perceived, the notion of legality and the implication that justice would be 
achieved per legem, through a judicial process associated with the institutions of royal 
law. Beyond its symbolic aspect, this notion also implied the practical use of the book 
as a reference for the advocate and assessors who would conduct that legal process and 
apply the Ius supremum. The legal culture that developed in the age of the ius scriptum 
allowed the various legal actors associated with the court to avail themselves of the 
habits of mind, the variae causarum ﬁ gurae, of the ius commune, a reception that left 
a mark in the High Court’s most esteemed law book in the form of a canon and a civil 
law prescription that were assumed by the Ius supremum. Likewise were the contents of 
the various other notations in the book absorbed into the Ius supremum. As a legal refer-
ence, the codex BJ 168 was a practical instrument of artiﬁ cial memory for contemporary 
use, a newer idea about the use of books that coincided with the beginning of true record 
keeping in the fourteenth and ﬁ fteenth centuries92. The practical and symbolic uses of 
the book are combined on the ﬁ nal page of codex BJ 168, the oaths page. As a practical 
matter, the bottom of the page is a brief formulary for the High Court’s oaths of ofﬁ ce. 
More striking, of course, is the ceremonial use of the book as a vessel for the biblical text 
on which the court’s members swore to carry out their duties justly (sprawyedlywy ortel 
znacz chcze or recht orteil funden wil) and under the aegis of legality (podlug prawa or 
noch dem rechte) as they touched Scripture that proclaimed, “In the beginning there was 
the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”. The text was biblical, 
but the ceremony was not conducted with a Bible, perhaps quite intentionally. For be-
neath the Gospel text pressed by the hand of the juror lay king, custom, written law, legal 
process, and divine providence – justice in all its later medieval aspects, both novel and 
traditional. What greater symbolism could there have been than a combination of justice 
guaranteed by the law and order established by royal authority, normative precepts that 
promised justice through legal process, and the certainty of divine justice, of which all 
else was a pale reﬂ ection? As an amalgam of all these aspects of justice, as speciﬁ cally 
reﬂ ected in the court’s activity, it is no wonder that codex BJ 168 was a treasured posses-
sion of the High Court of Magdeburg Law at the Castle of Kraków from its foundation 
in 1356 until it ceased operation in 1794. 
The codex is likewise precious to the historian as a window to a range of perceptions 
that accompanied trends in later medieval legal development. It would be overly simplis-
tic to say that the transition from the medieval to the modern entailed a shift in mentality 
from a symbolic to literal understanding of the structures and relationships of human 
society. Nevertheless, the symbolic was clearly more pronounced in the legal culture of, 
say, the eleventh century, than it was several centuries later. Arguably, a shift of emphasis 
in legal consciousness from the concrete, yet ﬁ gurative to the abstract, yet literal that 
began in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and continued well into the early modern 
period resulted in a general change in the legal culture of western Christendom. This 
change, however, was accomplished over a long period and the presence of one world-
92  Ibidem, p. 123–125.
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view does not necessarily mean the absence of another or their incompatibility. Indeed, 
codex BJ 168, which, as argued above represents both mentalities with respect to the use 
legal texts, embodies the coexistence of continuity and change in the legal conscious-
ness and legal culture of a particular later medieval jurisdiction. This duality reminds us 
that studies of legal development that do not adequately account for the larger social and 
cultural context are perilous undertakings that may well misrepresent human realities. 
Perhaps, for a moment, one might again imagine Andrzej Czarnisza – his inventory 
of relics complete and the ink dry, he closes the book before him and carefully places it 
in the chest that contained the court’s record books and ceremonial paraphernalia – an 
early link in a chain of custodians who preserved this codex for some four centuries as 
if it were a precious jewel. 
The Text and Textualization of Codex BJ 168: Legal Culture in Transition 
at the High Court of Magdeburg Law at the Castle of Kraków
S u m m a r y
“Text and Textualization” examines the various symbolic and practical uses of a law book possessed by 
the High Court of Magdeburg Law at the Castle of Kraków through the entirety of its four centuries of 
operation. The essay contends that this book, now preserved at the library of the Jagiellonian University 
as manuscript codex BJ 168, played a vital symbolic role alongside its practical function. In the course 
of detailing these aspects, the study suggests that the multiple purposes for which the codex was used 
are illustrative of several aspects of the court’s peculiar culture during its medieval period of operation 
and beyond. Methodologically, the essay employs the notion of textualization as a tool for understanding 
what roles codex BJ 168 played in the context of the culture of the court and how its component texts 
represented different varieties of legal consciousness within that culture. First, the essay argues that the 
codex served an important purpose as a textualized object – as the symbolic representation of the Ius 
supremum Magdeburgense castri Cracoviensis and all that it signiﬁ ed. Secondly, the codex served as 
an exemplar of ius scriptum – law literally textualized – that composed a repository of, and reference 
to, the law represented by the Ius supremum. The essay ultimately argues that the dual function of the 
codex, which dates to the court’s fourteenth-century foundation, points to the complexity of the social 
and cultural context in which later medieval legal development occurred. Indeed, this duality represents 
a general transformation in the broader legal culture of Latin Christendom – a culture that was marked 
by the coexistence of different perspectives in legal consciousness – and suggests that elements of both 
continuity and change can comfortably coexist within a legal culture over long historical periods. 
